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Abstract 
This paper brings together three different accounts of the role of replication in 
management studies:  replication as ‘scientific project’, replication as ‘socio-cultural 
artefact’; replication as ‘aesthetic practice’.  Each of these is developed from within 
separate reference frames: epistemology, the sociology of science, and the philosophy 
of art.  This offers new scope to revisit a fundamental question in management 
studies, namely: why is there a gap between the espoused value placed upon 
replication, and the actual paucity of replication studies?  Each reference frame offers 
different insights into the nature of replication.  The paper argues that by integrating 
all three, and by understanding the potential contribution of the philosophy of art, a 
more realistic account of theory development is possible; one that explains why 
successive calls to researchers to replicate fall on deaf ears.  Despite the empirical 
evidence to suggest replication studies are undervalued, and the problems posed by 
postmodernist challenges to science, we reiterate the importance of replication. 
 
Introduction 
Imagine a party.  It’s 10:30 PM.  Pretend every guest represents a scientific discipline.  
The Mathematician, the Chemist, the Physicist and the Biologist are perched in 
separate corners of the room, each busily doing their own thing.  The Anthropologist 
is reflecting on how a variety of seemingly strange practices are made legitimate via 
ritual.  The Psychologist is not actually participating, but is watching to see how much 
fun other people are having.  The Sociologist is concerned about those who were not 
invited, wondering why were they excluded.  The Economist is working out what the 
opportunity cost of coming was.  Suddenly (rather late), in walks the Management 
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scientist.  Invited at the last minute, they weren’t sure what to wear.  On reflection, the 
red, frilly tuxedo and yellow dress-shirt was not a good choice.  Someone coughs and 
there is an embarrassed silence.  During the silence, each pauses, imagining the next 
party:  what would they do?  The Anthropologist thinks, ‘I wonder if there will be a 
pattern to these rituals’.  The Psychologist thinks, ‘I must find some more interesting 
people to observe’.  The Sociologist thinks, ‘maybe I can go to another party instead, 
perhaps in a rougher part of town’.  The Economist thinks, ‘it’ll be a waste of time, I 
can stay at home and have more fun developing a theory of parties’.  The 
Management scholar thinks, ‘next time I’ll wear the red frilly tuxedo, but this time 
with a blue shirt.’ 
 
Going to someone else’s party is an extended metaphor, or allegory, for replicating 
theory.  It is a useful allegory because it connotes three inter-related spheres of action: 
the conventional, the social and the aesthetic.  In turn, these point to three problems 
facing the management researcher wishing to carry out replications.  Firstly, in terms 
of convention, there is a profound lack of consensus in management research, and this 
makes it difficult for management scholars to conduct research in an organised way.  
This is notable in the paradigm (or ‘Pfefferdigm’) debate (Hasard and Kelemen, 2002; 
Pfeffer, 1993; Van Maanen, 1995; Weick, 1999).  Secondly, in terms of relations with 
other disciplines, there is uncertainty as to the status of management research.  This 
arises in part from the broad challenge of carrying out social science research, but also 
because management research is eclectic and borrows from a number of more well 
established social sciences.  Uncertainty also arises from a recognition of the limits of 
scientific methods, and scepticism about the claims of science to be value-free, 
progressive or objective (Allen, 2003; Potter, 1996; Thorpe, 2001).  Thirdly, in terms 
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of aesthetics, the allegory emphasises the significance of emotional and intuitional 
responses to attempts by management researchers to replicate theory.  In part this 
response can be understood in terms of the appeal of novelty, or uniqueness 
(Bornstein, 1991, p. 73; Mone and McKinley, 1993), but it also captures the sense that 
different researchers have described, where in their efforts to replicate theory they 
encounter, ‘a vague sense of disrespect’ and their studies ‘are often second-class 
citizens’ (Hendrick, 1991, p. 42).  This is partly shown in the attitudes of some journal 
editors, who have (anonymously) commented on them as, ‘dull’, ‘boring’, stating that 
readers ‘aren’t interested in them’, because they ‘don’t reflect cutting edge stuff’ (in 
Neuliep and Crandall, 1991, p. 88).  Setting aside the degree to which these comments 
are valid, it is important to recognise that these are aesthetic responses. 
 
The problem we face as management scholars is that we were late arriving, no one 
told us what to wear and when we do arrive we don’t know what to do.  In this paper, 
we share our thoughts about the problematic status of replication.  For some, 
replicating theory is a way of earning a living, or a way in which they contribute to 
knowledge.  For us it has (unwillingly) become a diverting, therapeutic exercise.  
Diverting: because to date it has in all probability been less fruitful than alternative 
methods would have been; therapeutic: because it has awakened an interest in some 
fundamental questions that have a bearing on management theory.  We have nodded 
to Popper (falsificationism), winked at Tsang and Kwan (replication) and flirted with 
Sayer (critical realism).  Our nods, winks and flirtations have been unsuccessful, and 
we remain unsure as to the status of replication.  In the process of trying to test and 
develop an influential theory, we have become dissatisfied with current accounts of 
what replication means, what purpose it serves, and what its fundamental value is.  
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This paper is an attempt to address these problems, with a radical overhaul of 
replication.  In doing so we summarise three views of the role of replication in 
organisational theory, developing the themes of the conventional, the social and the 
aesthetic.  Each of these has its particular insights.  Associated with each view is a 
wider domain of enquiry.  Together insights from these fields offer a more 
comprehensive and realistic description of the status of replication in management 
studies. 
 
Theory Development as ‘Scientific Project’ 
The first view of replication that we outline - replication as ‘scientific project’, is the 
most well articulated to date.  The term science is sometimes used pejoratively, or as a 
basis to undermine claims that research can be value free, unencumbered by ideology, 
or a source of progress (Allen, 2003, p. 291; Potter, 1996; Thorpe, 2001).  Though we 
discuss these themes in the following section, in this section, we try to use science in a 
descriptive way that is intended to be non-pejorative, so that it serves an analytic 
purpose.  In describing the ‘scientific project’ account of theory development, we 
wish to retain a naïve, or ‘folk concept’ (c.f. Becker, 1970) of scientific practice; in 
other words, where replication itself is seen as a technology for developing, 
‘knowledge as science (in the sense of academic knowledge)’, which is separate from 
‘knowledge as culture’ (Delanty, 2001, p. 151).  This has the advantage of allowing us 
to differentiate between the technical and epistemological challenges posed by a 
technology of replication, and the social or cultural challenges to such a project.  An 
added advantage is that retaining this sense of the scientific allows us to hold on to 
our belief that replication can be useful as a technical procedure.  Lest we be criticised 
for running with the scientific fox and then hunting with the postmodern hounds, this 
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is prompted by a desire to offer a wider ranging, revisionist account of replication.  
This necessitates engaging with the debate not just from within one camp, but from 
several, in an attempt to escape the current ‘figuration’, i.e. the existing meaning and 
value laden frame in which we understand the term replication (Elias, 1970). 
 
A number of organisational theorists have explored the legitimacy of developing 
theory in management studies, by invoking comparisons with other disciplines (Cole, 
1993); where a conventional view of theory development is that empirical data can be 
called upon to support, or refute theory (Bacharach, 1989; Chimezie and Osigweh, 
1989; Eden, 2002; Glass, 2000; Neuliep, 1991; Tsang and Kwan, 1999).  For 
example, falsifiability has long been advocated as a necessary criterion for theory in 
the natural sciences (Hendrick, 1991; Magee, 1971; Popper, 1959, 1962).  This is 
because no amount of confirmatory evidence can prove a theory holds true for all 
time, as proof by induction is always open to question.  A falsifiability criterion 
allows comparison between competing explanations of phenomena according to 
whether they are testable (and hence in principle open to falsification), or not testable.  
However, adopting falsifiability as a necessary criterion for management studies is 
problematic because the absence of immutable laws means rigorous standards of 
falsification are impossible (Tsang and Kwan, 1999).  Others have pointed out that the 
falsifiability criterion itself is not open to falsification, and hence an inappropriate 
dictum even for the natural sciences (Brief, 2003).  Nonetheless, falsifiability is often 
represented as a desirable, or traditional characteristic of organizational theory 
(Bacharach, 1989, p. 500; Lee et al, 1999, p. 459; Mitchell and James, 2001, p. 543; 
Whetten, 1989, p. 486-487; Worren, Moore and Elliot, 2002, p. 1227).  According to 
Sayer (1992, p. 204), the implication of social scientists adopting a falsifiability 
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criterion is that we may be either unduly pessimistic, or naively optimistic about the 
possibilities of developing theory. 
 
To accept that replication can be valid offers some of the advantages of a falsifiability 
criterion, because it permits the accumulation of empirical knowledge.  It also implies 
that theory can be developed, because it acknowledges the importance of observation 
and testing.  However, it does not commit us to such rigorous standards of closure, 
because whether replication is successful, is more clearly seen as a matter of degree, 
rather than success or failure (Rosenthal, 1991a).  If we believe that replication has 
some potential to be applied in management studies, this suggests that organizational 
researchers need to understand the particular conditions that apply in the social 
sciences (i.e. the ways in which it differs from the natural sciences), before they can 
put replication to work.  A starting point is to acknowledge that accepting the validity 
of replication means committing to some basic beliefs about the nature of reality.  The 
claim that management theories can be replicated is open to challenge in the same 
sense in which correspondence and coherence theories of truth are open to challenge.  
A correspondence theory of truth holds that truth consists in agreement with reality; in 
other words, what determines whether a statement is true is whether it corresponds 
with ‘the way things are’ (Flew, 1984, p. 76).  A coherence theory of truth holds that 
truth consists in agreement with an established system; in other words, whether a 
statement is true concerns, ‘a relation among propositions, not a relation between a 
proposition and … a state-of-affairs’ (Hospers, 1973, p. 116, original emphasis).  
Replication studies depend on a correspondence account of truth, insofar as they 
assume the researcher is able to discriminate accurately between and compare two 
different situations in which a theory is tested.  Replication studies also depend on a 
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coherence account of truth, because to incorporate it as a tool of inquiry, replication 
must be construed as part of a wider framework for sense-making. 
 
If reality is understood as purely socially constructed – an anti-realist stance - this 
denies the validity of any replication study.  For anti-realists, there is no sensible way 
to talk about different situations in terms of an underlying theory, since this assumes a 
degree of objective knowledge about the ways in which two situations differ.  This is 
a stance that Sayer refers to as ‘unfounded pessimism’ (1992, p. 204).  Conversely, to 
believe the social world exists independently of our cognition, and that access to it is 
unproblematic – a naïve realist stance - means replication is always valid irrespective 
of mode of inquiry.  This is what Sayer calls ‘exaggerated optimism’ (ibid).  Rejecting 
anti-realism means committing to the belief that the ‘social world has a reality of its 
own’ (Burrell and Morgan 1979, p. 4).  Rejecting naïve-realism means committing to 
the belief that access to this reality is fundamentally problematic and mediated (Sayer, 
1992) – a critical realist stance. 
 
For critical realists, replication can be valid across a range of settings, though this is 
contingent, because access to the social world is problematic, and ‘social structures 
and their causal powers operate beyond the immediate perceptions of individuals’ 
(Roberts, 2001: 669).  The promise of critical realism is that it offers an 
epistemological basis from which to divine such structures, and hence it allows for the 
possibility of developing and testing theory (Bhaskar, 1989; Sayer, 1992; Tsang and 
Kwan, 1999).  So, sharing a set of assumptions about the nature of reality (that it is 
socially mediated, but there are discernible regularities in structure) allows for 
replication, at least in principle.  This element of consensus can be helpful, and is seen 
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by some as a necessary precursor for scientific investigation.  For example, Chimezie 
and Osigweh (1989, p. 580) argue, ‘imprecise concepts make it difficult to produce 
knowledge that is cumulative’, and this point is made even more strongly by Cole, 
‘[w]ithout agreement on fundamentals, scientists will not be able to build on the work 
of others and will spend all their time debating assumptions and first principles’ 
(1983, p. 134 in Pfeffer, 1993, p. 611).  Similarly, Grunow advocates that, in the face 
of challenges from postmodernism, ‘debate on organization theory needs a starting 
point for communication’ (Grunow, 1995).  These sentiments owe much to the 
Kuhnian notion that ‘normal science’ allows the accumulation of knowledge because 
of a shared paradigm (Hendrick, 1991; Kuhn, 1962; Pfeffer, 1993).  Endless debate is 
avoided because there are clearly defined limits as to which questions are meaningful.  
The difficulty for organizational theory is that one result of ‘agreement on 
fundamentals’ may be staid consensus, if one of the agreed fundamentals is how to 
conduct research.  Scope for ‘style’ (Van Maanen, 1995) and the rejection of a clear 
paradigm may be a source of strength, diversity and creativity (Zald, 1996). 
 
This three-part classification (above) of epistemological stances is an 
oversimplification since there are many different ways of looking at the world, and 
few researchers would confine themselves to the naïve realist, or anti-realist camps.  
However, these two polar types illustrate how at the extremes, there is no question as 
to the suitability of replication.  Since most social science researchers do not hold 
either of these extreme positions, those of us in between face a dilemma, which can be 
framed in the following way: 
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If there is scope to accumulate knowledge about events in the social world, then we 
should test theory.  If it is possible to identify and address limitations via logical 
critique, theory can be developed.  To accomplish both goals requires a type of testing 
that is flexible enough to allow for theory development, but rigorous enough to 
preserve the logic of a repeated test.  Otherwise, any investigation must choose 
between ‘creating’ a new theory, or ‘testing’ an existing theory.  We suggest this 
tension between theory development and theory testing is an unavoidable, archetypal 
research dilemma (cf McGrath, 1982).  In any replication, there must be a degree of 
sufficient similarity, otherwise it will not count as a test, yet without a degree of 
extension, or development, the test will be open to the charge of not making a 
contribution (Hendrick, 1991).  Following Lykken (1968, in Eden, 2002, p. 842), for a 
replication to be considered sufficiently similar, it must allow for testing of the ‘same 
hypothesized relationships among the same theoretical constructs’.  Given these 
constraints, the most potentially useful tests will be those that differ as much as 
possible from the prior study or studies, so as to establish the generality of the theory 
(Rosenthal, 1991b).  As well as the where and how, such differences extend to who 
carries out the replication (Eden, 2002; Hendrick, 1991).  Tests by researchers wholly 
unconnected with the original authors of a theory are preferable, since they are 
normally regarded as more objective (Rosenthal, 1991b; Tsang and Kwan, 1999). 
 
The degree to which a replication study differs is often described in terms of discrete 
types: for example, the difference between ‘literal’, ‘strict’ or ‘exact’ replications, and 
‘conceptual’ replications (Hendrick, 1991; Hubbard, Vetter and Little, 1998; Tsang 
and Kwan, 1999); or in terms of replications that test ‘reliability’, versus those that 
test external ‘validity’ (Rosenthal, 1991a); or ‘reproducibility’ and ‘generalizability’ 
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(Amir and Sharon, 1991); or that establish ‘authenticity’ (Hubbard et al, 1998).  
However, it is more sensible to consider replications as lying on a range, given that 
the number of ways in which two studies can differ from one another is indeterminate.  
This range can be understood in terms of the tension between maintaining sufficient 
similarity (to preserve replication status), and maximising scope for difference (to 
enhance potential contribution).  This is a reformulation of the tension between theory 
testing and theory development (above). 
 
Perversely perhaps, given the value placed on novelty in management studies (Mone 
and McKinley, 1993) a replication study that is an unqualified success, is also one that 
tells us nothing new (Bornstein, 1991).  If on the other hand, the replication calls 
previous findings into question, this ‘null result’ is not valuable unless the original 
theory has been closely followed in the replication.  This is because it is otherwise 
impossible to know whether failure is to be explained in terms of the inadequacy of 
the original theory, or because of the changes made prior to replication (Tsang and 
Kwan, 1999).  These dilemmas make carrying out replication research a risky 
business, implying that researchers need a degree of prescience (or perhaps pre-
science). 
 
 
it may be possible to have, ‘surrogates or substitutes or equivalents of replication 
within the assumption structure of other approaches to inquiry’ (Weick, 1999, p. 800).   
 
Theory Development as Socio-Cultural Artefact 
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There is an established sense in which scientific practices can be seen as culturally 
embedded, and historically contingent, rather than simply being a search for 
transcendental truths.  This idea is addressed in several strands of literature that 
examine and problematise the status of science and the nature of scientific knowledge.  
Below, we have organised these strands into three sections, each of which has 
implications for an account of replication:  science as discourse; knowledge as 
characterised by production and consumption; and the role of the scientific 
community.  The insights from each of these strands show how it is difficult to retain 
a folk concept of science, since they each demonstrate the influence of political and 
cultural norms, values and ideologies on scientific research. 
 
1. The literature on science as discourse, or as discursive practice (Foucault, 1979 / 
2002; Latour 1993; Potter 1996), suggests that  instead of an ahistorical, 
transcendent view of science, we see it as something whose: 
 
social meaning becomes a problem to be understood, both in terms of how it is 
accomplished as an ongoing practice by particular scientists in particular 
settings, and how it is understood socially and culturally as a type of resource 
(Locke, 2001, p. 11).   
 
This analysis shows how scientific procedures such as replication can be recast as 
rhetorical devices, or linguistic tropes.  Instead of being represented as discrete 
parts of a technology, or abstract system, these can be understood as part of an 
overarching ideology, or discourse.  Calling on themes of rationality, precision 
and science may be useful in legitimating the practice of management studies as 
an academic discipline, and enable us to draw comparisons with higher prestige 
disciplines.  The ideal practice of replication can then become represented as 
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something we should aspire to, and something which advances in technological 
and statistical procedures, or paradigm development will soon make a reality 
(Pfeffer, 1993; Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003).  This analysis would be one 
means of explaining the gap between an espoused valuing of replication, as a 
‘‘must’ for advancement’ (Amir and Sharon, 1991), and the paucity of replication 
studies (Hubbard et al, 1998; Neuliep, 1991).  It is easier to appreciate a gap 
between the normative and actual values of replication in management studies, if 
replication is seen as a rhetorical resource, rather than a precision instrument.   
 
2. Understanding knowledge as characterised by relations of production and 
consumption rather than discovery or invention, similarly denies a transcendent 
status to science (Bourdieu, 1990, 1993).  In this way, theories are socially 
constituted, ‘consumption of knowledge fuels the creation of new knowledge 
while new knowledge acquires its status as ‘knowledge’ only when selected for 
consumption by important players’ (Hassard and Kelemen, 2002, p. 333).  These 
themes of production and consumption can also be seen in terms of the 
sanctioning and legitimation of a theory by the research community (Kuhn, 1962).  
This in turn encourages further research, with the potential development of shared 
methodologies, and ‘schooling’ (McKinley, Mone and Moon, 1999; Pfeffer, 
1993); less optimistically, this can result in tribalism, or groupthink (Campbell, 
1979; Janis, 1982).  One perspective is that social and cultural changes have 
altered the relations between scientific communities and wider society, 
necessitating new forms of knowledge production (Gibbons et al, 1994; Delanty, 
2001; Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons, 2001; Starkey, 2001).  The idea that there is, 
or that there should be, coherence between scientific practices and the social 
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world hints at a trajectory of progress, where the demands of social change are 
met by changes in the way the academy operates.  In this sense, those advocating 
new forms of knowledge production make a slightly different point from those 
identifying patterns of production and consumption, since this process implies a 
final purpose, or telos.  However, the notion that theory should be developed and 
tested so as to remain relevant to the needs of diverse stakeholders (Starkey and 
Madan, 2001), implicitly invokes the notion of consumption, and consumers.  In 
this light, replication can be understood as one means of producing knowledge 
that is relevant, or palatable.  The gap between the normative and actual value of 
replication could be a reflection of the particular tastes of the academic 
community, for whom replication studies are insufficiently novel (Neuliep and 
Crandall, 1991). 
 
3. There is also an established sense in which scientific communities can be 
understood as playing a part in constituting social order, since they may be 
perceived as the embodiment of authority and wisdom (Durkheim, 1957; Giddens, 
1990; Merton, 1938 / 1973; Polanyi, 1946; Weber, 1958).  Whether for good or 
ill, the academic community can be seen as standard bearers for the advancement 
of knowledge, as secular priests, with new moral ideals, such as objectivity.  
‘Deprived of the shepherding role of the Christian clergy, there is a temptation to 
look to a new, scientific clergy for moral guidance’ (Thorpe, 2001, p. 20), 
however, since science does not provide such moral guidance, or a sense of 
certainty, this can lead to disenchantment (Giddens, 1990).  The roots of this 
analysis lie with Nietzsche’s exposition of the self-contained, subversive dialectic 
embodied in the ‘ascetic ideal’. 
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 You see what it was that really triumphed over the Christian god:  morality 
itself, the concept of truthfulness that was understood ever more rigorously, 
the father confessor’s refinement of the Christian conscience, translated and 
sublimated into a scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any 
price (Nietzsche, 1887 / 1974). 
 
Nietzsche’s exposition is relevant to the debate on replication, since it shows by 
analogy how the view of replication as ‘scientific project’ contains within itself 
the seeds of its own destruction.  The complexities of the social world preclude 
discovery of truths, and relying on technologies such as replication to do so is 
misguided, however appealing replication may at first appear in terms of its 
‘intellectual cleanliness’. 
 
All these illustrate how the procedure of replication can be understood as embedded 
in the practices of particular communities, so that it can legitimately be interpreted as 
a socio-cultural artefact, or symbol, rather than a discrete technique that forms part of 
a scientific project.  In turn these different strands suggest potential explanations for 
the disparity between the espoused and actual value of replication studies.  
Replication may be analogous to a linguistic trope, which management scholars draw 
on as a normative ideal, but merely pay lip service to in practice; it may be one form 
of knowledge production, that results in forms of knowledge that are less readily 
consumable; it may signify an internally incoherent procedure, that exemplifies the 
contradictions inherent in pursuing unattainable ideals of objectivity or truth in the 
social sciences.  This wider, political aspect to replication resonates with some of the 
fundamental problems posed by postmodernist critiques that undermine claims to 
objectivity and unmediated access to truth (Lyotard, 1984).  However, before 
outlining the final view of replication as aesthetic practice, it is worth noting that there 
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are ways in which scholars working in what we have called the ‘scientific project’ 
camp have identified with and acknowledged these themes.  For example, Pfeffer 
(1995, p. 684) advocates the importance of replication, in a way that he claims is 
independent of any arguments over method.  The ability to extend, replicate and adapt 
others’ work, ‘is simply an ecological argument; the ability to readily reproduce gives 
ideas (just as it does other forms) survival value’.  The emphasis on replication and 
selection echoes Baum’s view of organisational ecology (Baum, 1997), and outside 
the field of management studies other theorists offer explanations for various 
phenomena ranging from the success of best-sellers (Dawkins, 1998, p. 302), to 
explanations of language and consciousness (Dennett, 1993), to the origins of life 
(Dawkins, 1997, pp. 254-271) in similar, ecological terms.  Seeing replication in this 
wider context reinforces the importance of understanding the influence of political 
and social structures on the development of organizational theory, but it does not rule 
out the idea that replication can have some intrinsic value. 
 
Paradoxically perhaps, (given that the main thrust of these challenges is to undermine 
the value of scientific objectivity) the socio-cultural account of replication underlines 
a key benefit of critical testing.  If it is possible to simultaneously test theory, and 
accumulate knowledge, while allowing for experiment and improvisation, then 
replication can be a source of development, or critique rather than simply being a 
vehicle for reinforcement.  Appealing though this notion is, it is perhaps unrealistic in 
the face of evidence suggesting that replication studies are not actually valued 
(Hubbard et al, 1998).  To explore this further, it is beneficial to consider the insights 
from another perspective, namely replication as an aesthetic practice. 
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Theory Development as Aesthetic: The Philosophy of Art 
Strati and Montoux (2002, p. 757) advocate the relevance of aesthetics in 
management studies, arguing that the, ‘sharp distinction between science and art in 
organizational studies’ has ‘lost legitimacy’: 
 
The split between scientific discourse and aesthetic experience has faded 
(ibid.). 
 
This position is the starting point for our introduction of the philosophy of art to this 
debate.  As the previous two sections show, even researchers working with what we 
have called a ‘scientific project’ account of replication recognise the influence of 
cultural and political pressures (Hubbard et al, 1998; Neuliep and Crandall, 1991; 
Pfeffer, 1993; Tsang and Kwan, 1999).  In this section we try to show that eliding the 
split between scientific discourse and aesthetic experience may be one way in which 
replication can be revalued.  To do this, we draw on recent work advocating greater 
recognition of the influence of aesthetic experience on contemporary research (Strati, 
1999; Strati and Montoux, 2002). 
 
In a tripartite framework, Strati (1999, pp. 188-190) outlines different approaches to 
organizational aesthetics in the study of culture:  the ‘archaeological approach’; the 
‘empathic-logical approach’; and the ‘empathic-aesthetic approach’.  Using this 
classification, the approach we try to follow in this paper is perhaps closest to the 
archaeological approach, where, ‘[t]he researcher assumes the guise of an 
archaeologist or a historian of art to investigate values and symbols… to explore the 
information yielded by the artefacts or fragments of artefacts about the ‘civilizations’ 
that created them’ (Strati and Montoux, 2002, p. 756).  To some extent, we have 
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already adopted an archaeological approach in our analysis of the preceding section, 
because treating replication as a socio-cultural artefact, involved considering 
processes of legitimation and sanction (‘values and symbols’); their associated 
patterns of production and consumption (creation and use of ‘artefacts’); and the 
relationship between communities and social order (‘civilizations’).  Here however, 
we want to widen the scope of our investigation, to draw out some of the more 
general insights that the philosophy of art can bring, in terms of further eliding the 
‘split between scientific discourse and aesthetic experience’. 
 
We argue that this split is illusory and that maintaining it results in intellectual 
incoherence.  This makes a realistic account of the status of replication unattainable.  
This is because the view of replication as a tool to enhance the accumulation of 
empirical knowledge (the ‘scientific project’), is to a degree incompatible with the 
view that theory development is embedded in a particular context (the ‘socio-cultural 
artefact’).  Recognition of socio-historical contingency is in direct conflict with 
scientific claims (to universalisability, objectivity and generalisability).  However, the 
failure to acknowledge the role of aesthetic responses in theory development, means 
that adherents to the ‘scientific project’ view do not have a coherent way of 
explaining the paucity of replication studies, since replications are a means to enhance 
universalisability, objectivity and generalisability.  Neither do adherents to the 
scientific project view have a means of solving the problem of the ‘second class’ 
status of replication studies (Hendrick, 1991).  Existing ‘solutions’ (e.g. to have 
replication only journals, to improve the quality of replication studies, to have a 
certain number of pages in leading journals devoted to replication studies, Hubbard et 
al, 1998; Neuliep, 1991 passim) are incoherent, because they address the problem in a 
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mechanistic way.  Instead, we argue that a revaluation of the status of replication 
studies can only come about through recognition of the aesthetic dimension to theory 
development, and through recognition that a scientific discourse / aesthetic split is a 
charade.  Although we do not know what the mechanism for such a widespread 
reappraisal might be, we offer in this section some ways in which to reappraise this.  
 
There are several ways in which insights from the philosophy of art are relevant to the 
debate on replication.  Firstly, in relation to the ‘scientific project’ account of 
replication, it is legitimate to introduce the notion of replication as a skilled craft.  For 
example, Rosenthal (1991a, pp. 17-25) makes a convincing argument for relying on 
effect sizes (e.g. ‘r’ and ‘Z’ values), rather than statistical significance (‘p’ values); for 
reporting statistical power.  This is not simply a rhetorical trick, since (if we accept 
the legitimacy of replication) there are sound statistical reasons for prioritising 
summary statistics other than ‘p’ values; ‘p’ values may simply be a function of 
sample size, which is not usually the most meaningful basis for comparing two 
studies.  Introducing an element of craft, suggests one way in which aesthetic and 
scientific criteria are already brought to bear on evaluating replication studies.  One 
way of closing the gap between aesthetic and scientific discourse could be to 
reintroduce the Aristotelian notion of techne, which is the root of our modern word 
technique, but which also has connotations of mastery (Worren et al, 2002, p. 1228). 
 
Secondly, again in relation to the ‘scientific project’ sense of replication, there is a 
useful parallel to be drawn between attempts to resolve the question ‘what is a work 
of art’, and the problem of what constitutes a replication.  In neither case can we rely 
on a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.  Though this is true of other concepts 
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as well, Dickie’s (1974) attempt to resolve this question is noteworthy.  Though this 
theory is called institutional theory in aesthetics, to avoid confusion, we shall refer to 
it as Dickie’s theory.  In response to the question, ‘what is art?’ it states: 
 
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artefact (2) a set of the 
aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for 
appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social 
institution (the artworld) (Dickie, 1974, p. 34, in Hanfling, 1992, p. 20). 
 
There are several parallels with Dickie’s definition, and the problematic status of 
replication.  First, it deals with classification, and so avoids the problematic issue of 
discussing whether something is of superior, or inferior quality.  Second, it refers to 
something that is created, ‘an artefact’.  Third, it focuses only on the relevant features 
of the artefact, ‘a set of the aspects’.  Fourth, it indicates there is an element of 
sanction ‘has conferred upon it’ by powerful individual(s) ‘by some person or 
persons’.  Fifth, these individuals represent a wider social institution, ‘the artworld’.  
Recognising the significance of the conferral of status illuminates a comment by 
Eden, 2002, namely that he would bet a year’s pay that most studies are in some sense 
replicative.  What is interesting is that so few of these studies are labelled replications.  
Revisiting this might cause a significant reappraisal of the status of replication.  A 
slightly more subtle point is that adopting an amended version of Dickie’s theory 
would recognise that replication studies are artefacts, and in some sense authentic 
works, rather than simply copies.  This could also be a way of revising the status of 
these studies as second class citizens. 
 
It is interesting to note the way in which some influential theorists have advocated 
aesthetic judgment as an integral part of theory building and theory testing in 
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management research (Van Maanen, 1995a, 1995b; Weick, 1993).  For example, Van 
Maanen argues persuasively against a Pfefferdigm, by advocating consideration of 
‘style’ in conducting research (Van Maanen, 1995a).  This is not simply a rejection of 
homogeneity in design and epistemology, on aesthetic grounds, but also illustrates the 
effect that modes of theorising have on us as individuals, and on the people, processes 
and systems we study.  Van Maanen illustrates how the gap between the scientific and 
the aesthetic is elided in the process of building theory: 
 
By trying to write like everyone else (and not talking about it in public), we 
not only bore ourselves to tears but restrict the range of our inquiries and 
speculations (ibid., p. 139).  
 
So, adopting a model of consensus is not simply a technical or scientific agreement on 
convention, but a choice that involves social regulation, and it is also an adoption of 
an aesthetic, that in turn influences the way in which we represent the world.  Weick 
also advocates an aesthetic sensibility in theory development, ‘[w]henever one reacts 
with the feeling that’s interesting, that reaction is a clue that current experience has 
been tested against past experience, and the past understanding has been found 
inadequate’ (1993, p. 525, original emphasis).  This also elides the scientific / 
aesthetic split, by recognising the importance of an emotional response to theorising.  
It also suggests one way in which the response to replication could be reappraised, 
namely by revisiting the status of null results.  In one sense, ‘failed’ replications do 
not contribute because they fail to offer support for a theory.  We have argued that 
falsification is an unrealistic goal for management theory, because we cannot ever 
‘refute’ a theory of management, (instead we can perhaps claim to redefine the limits 
within which it is generalisable).  This implies null results in replication studies do not 
even have the negative contribution they do in other disciplines.  Further, since so few 
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replications are exact, or literal (given the desire for novelty), a null result is doubly 
empty.  It does not represent a contribution, nor does it seem to offer scope to explain 
failure.  Nonetheless, we would contend that such results are intrinsically more 
interesting either than exact replications (which may support, or critique a theory), or 
extensions that develop support for a theory.  This revaluation is possible if we 
understand the aesthetic dimension to theory, because, as Weick argues: 
 
A disconfirmed assumption is an opportunity for a theorist to learn something 
new, to discover something unexpected, to generate renewed interest in an old 
question, to mystify something that had previously seemed settled, to heighten 
intellectual stimulation, to get recognition and to alleviate boredom (ibid.). 
 
This extract also offers a nice summary of the three spheres of action we have 
discussed:  the scientific ‘opportunity… to learn [and] discover’, the aesthetic 
‘stimulation’, and the social ‘recognition’.  Well conducted replication studies that 
disconfirm assumptions offer a basis for learning something new.  If they are viewed 
in this light, rather than as ‘failing’ to support a theory, then those considering 
carrying out a replication do not need prescience, since the outcomes of the study will 
be symmetrical and equally valuable (either extending theory, or a basis for further 
study). 
 
If we acknowledge that it is legitimate to view theory development as the creation of 
cultural artefacts, and recognise processes of knowledge production and consumption, 
this makes the link between scientific and aesthetic discourse even stronger.  It also 
invokes an alternative means of explaining or investigating the problematic status of 
replication.  To explore this, we use an existing data set, from Neuliep and Crandall, 
(1991, p. 88) of ‘editor’s comments regarding the problems with publishing 
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replication studies’.  Rather than list all thirteen comments reported in Neuliep and 
Crandall’s survey of 47 social science journal editors, we select six that exemplify 
aesthetic responses to replications.  We code these in terms of three aesthetic qualities 
that we believe influence contemporary evaluation of replication:  authenticity, craft 
and novelty.  We do not claim that the comments reported indicate responses that are 
purely aesthetic, merely that they have a substantial aesthetic component.  As an 
aside, this procedure is an example of a replication study, using the same data set, but 
different analysis; in other words, what Tsang and Kwan (1999, p. 766) label 
‘reanalysis of data’.  Though the data well is very shallow, we feel it is sufficient to 
show how responses to replication studies can be understood as aesthetic: 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
6,344 words to here 
 
Maybe put a classificatory diagram or something in here? 
 
Conclusion 
This’ll be a summary of the above 
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Table 1: Reanalysis of Neuliep and Crandall, 1991 (selection of comments) 
 
Editor’s Comment Regarding Replication Studies Aesthetic Component 
‘Dull’ Novelty 
‘the worst of the modern science/social science publish 
or perish mentality’ 
Authenticity 
‘People aren’t interested in them’ Novelty 
‘When do you stop?  Is one rep enough or should we let 
someone build their career replicating the same study?’ 
Authenticity / Craft 
‘Readers feel that replications are redundant and don’t 
reflect cutting edge stuff’ 
Novelty / Craft 
‘They tend to be boring and not contribute a lot’ Novelty 
 24
References 
Abelson, M. A. (1987). ‘Examination of avoidable and unavoidable turnover’. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 72(3): 382-386. 
Abelson, R. P. (1981). ‘Psychological status of the script concept’. American 
Psychologist, 36(7): 715-729. 
Allen, D. G. and Griffeth, R. W. (2001). ‘Test of a Mediated Performance-Turnover 
Relationship Highlighting the Moderating Roles of Visibility and Reward 
Contingency’. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(5): 1014-1021. 
Amir, Y. and Sharon, I. (1991) ‘Replication Research: A ‘must’ for the scientific 
advancement of psychology’.  In J. Neuliep (Ed.) Replication Research in the Social 
Sciences, Sage, London: 51-69. 
Arnold, J., Cooper, C. L. and Robertson, I. T. (1995). Work Psychology: 
Understanding Human Behaviour in the Workplace.  London, Pitman. 
Bach, S. (1998). ‘NHS Pay Determination and Work Re-organization: employment 
relations reform in NHS trusts’. Employee Relations, 20(6): 565-576. 
Bacharach, S. B. (1989). ‘Organizational Theories: Some Criteria for Evaluation’. 
Academy of Management Review, 14(4): 496-515. 
Beach, L. R.  (1990). Image theory: decision making in personal and organizational 
contexts. Chichester, Wiley. 
Becker, H. (1970).  Sociological Work.  Aldine, Chicago. 
Berne, E.  (1975). What Do You Say After You Say Hello?. London, Corgi. 
Bhaskar, R. (1989). Reclaiming Reality, London, Verso. 
Bourdieu, P. (1990) The Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1993) The Field of Cultural Production. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 25
Bornstein, R. F. (1991) ‘Publication Politics, Experimenter Bias and the Replication 
Process in Social Science Research’, in J. Neuliep (Ed.) Replication Research in the 
Social Sciences, Sage, London: 71-81. 
Bozeman, D. P. and Perrewe, P. L. (2001). ‘The Effect of Item Content Overlap on 
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire-Turnover Cognitions Relationships’. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(1): 161-173. 
Brief, A. P. (2003) ‘Taking Ethics Seriously – A Mission Now More Possible’, 
Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 363-366. 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. Heinemann, London. 
Campbell, D. T. (1979). ‘A tribal model of the social system vehicle carrying 
scientific knowledge’. Knowledge:  Creation, Diffusion, Utilization, 1: 181-201. 
Campion, M. A. (1991). ‘Meaning and measurement in turnover: comparison of 
alternative measures and recommendations for research’. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 76(2): 199-212. 
Chimezie, A. B. and Osigweh, Y. G. (1989). ‘Concept fallibility in organizational 
science’. Academy of Management Review, 14(4): 579-594. 
Cohen, A. (1999). ‘Turnover Among Professionals: a longitudinal study of American 
lawyers’. Human Resource Management, 38(1): 61-75. 
Cole, S. (1993). ‘The hierarchy of the sciences?’. American Journal of Sociology, 89: 
111-139. 
Dalton, D. R., Johnson, J. L. and Daily, C. M. (1999). ‘On the use of “intent to…” 
variables in organizational research: an empirical and cautionary assessment’. Human 
Relations, 52(10): 1337-1350. 
Dawkins, R. (1997). Climbing Mount Improbable. London, Penguin. 
 26
Dawkins, R. (1998). Unweaving the Rainbow. London, Penguin. 
Delanty G. (2001) ‘The University in the KnowledgeSociety’, Organization, 8(2): 
149–153. 
Dennett, D. (1993). Consciousness explained. London, Penguin. 
Durkheim E. (1957) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, (Trans. Brookfield), 
Routledge, London. 
Eden D. (2002). ‘Replication, Meta-analysis, Scientific Progress and AMJ’s 
Publication Policy’, Academy of Management Journal, 45(5): 841-846. 
Elias (1970) What is Sociology, Hutchison, London. 
Flew, A. (Ed.) (1984). A Dictionary of Philosophy. Pan, London. 
Folger, R. and Turillo, C. J. (1999). ‘Theorizing as the Thickness of Thin 
Abstraction’. Academy of Management Review, 24(4): 742-758. 
Foucault M. (1979 / 2002) The Archaeology of Knowledge, Routledge Classics, 
London. 
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P. and Trow, M. 
(1984) The New Production of Knowledge. Sage, London. 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Gioia, D. A. (1986). ‘Symbols, scripts and sensemaking:  creating meaning in the 
organizational experience’. In Sims, H. and Gioia, D. (Eds.), The thinking 
organization.  49-74, San Francisco, Jossey Bass.   
Glass, G. V. (2000). ‘Meta-analysis at 25’. 
http://glass.ed.asu.edu/gene/papers/meta25.html accessed on 9/1/03 
Grunow, D. (1995) ‘The Research Design in Organization Studies: Problems and 
prospects’, Organization Science, 6(1): 93-103. 
 27
Hassard J. and Kelemen M. (2002) ‘Production and Consumption in Organizational 
Knowledge: The Case of the ‘Paradigms Debate’ Organization, 9(2): 331–355 
Hendrick, C. (1991). ‘Replications, Strict Replications, and Conceptual Replications:  
Are they important?’.  In J. Neuliep (Ed.) Replication Research in the Social Sciences, 
Sage, London: 41-49. 
Hesketh, B. (1993). ‘Measurement issues in industrial and organizational 
psychology’. In C. Cooper and I. Robertson (Eds.), International Review of Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology. 133-172, London, Wiley. 
Hom, P. W. and Griffeth, R. (1995). Employee Turnover. Ohio, South Western 
Publishing, Ohio. 
Hom, P. W. and Kinicki, A. J. (2001). ‘Toward a Greater Understanding of How 
Dissatisfaction Drives Employee Turnover’. Academy of Management Journal, 44(5): 
975-987. 
Hospers, J. (1973). An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. New Jersey, Prentice 
Hall. 
Janis, I. L. (1982). Victims of Groupthink.  Boston, Houghton Muffin. 
Johns, G.  (2001). ‘In praise of context’. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22: 31-
42. 
Judd, C. M., McClelland, G. H. and Culhane, S. E. (1995). ‘Data Analysis: 
Continuing issues…’. Annual Review, 433-465. 
Khatri, N., Fern, C. T. and Budwhar, P. (2001). ‘Explaining Employee Turnover in an 
Asian Context’. Human Resource Management Journal, 11(1): 54-74. 
Krackhardt, D. and Porter, L. W. (1986). ‘The snowball effect: turnover embedded in 
communication networks’. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71(1): 50-55. 
Kuhn T. S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 28
Latour, B. (1987) Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through 
Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Lee, T. W. and Mitchell, T. R. (1991). ‘The unfolding effects of organizational 
commitment and anticipated job satisfaction on voluntary employee turnover’.  
Motivation and Emotion, 15(1): 99-121. 
Lee, T. W. and Mitchell, T. R. (1994). ‘An Alternative Approach: the Unfolding 
Model of voluntary employee turnover’. Academy of Management Review, 19(1): 51-
89. 
Lee, T. W., Mitchell, T. R., Holtom, B. C., McDaniel, L. S. and Hill, J. W. (1999). 
‘The Unfolding Model of Voluntary Turnover: A Replication and Extension’. 
Academy of Management Journal, 42(4): 450-462. 
Lee, T. W., Mitchell, T. R., Wise, L. and Fireman, S. (1996). ‘An Unfolding Model of 
Voluntary Employee Turnover’. Academy of Management Journal, 39(1): 5-36. 
Lord, R. G. and Kernan, M. C. (1987). ‘Scripts as determinants of purposeful 
behavior in organizations’. Academy of Management Review, 122: 265-277. 
Louis, M. R. (1980). ‘Surprise and Sense Making: What newcomers experience in 
entering unfamiliar organizational settings’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25: 
226-251. 
Lykken, D. T. (1968). ‘Statistical Significance in Psychological Research’. 
Psychological Bulletin, 70: 151-159. 
Lyotard, J-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge. Manchester, 
Manchester University Press. 
McGrath, J. E. (1982). ‘Dilemmatics: the study of research choices and dilemmas’. In 
McGrath, J. E., Martin, J. and Kulka, R. Judgement calls in research. 69-102, 
London, Sage. 
 29
McKinley, W., Mone, W. A. and Moon, G. (1999). ‘Determinants and development 
of schools in organization theory’. Academy of Management Review, 24(4): 634-648. 
Maertz, C. P. and Campion, M. A. (2001). ‘Turnover’.  In Robertson, I and Cooper, 
C. (Eds), Personnel Psychology and HRM. London, Wiley. 
Magee, B.  (1971). Modern British Philosophy. London, Secker and Warburg. 
Mandler, J. M. (1984). Stories, Scripts and Scenes: Aspects of Schema Theory.  
London, Lawrence Erblaum Associates. 
March, J. G. and Simon, H. A.  (1958). Organizations.  New York, Wiley. 
Merton, R. K. (1938 / 1973) ‘Science and the Social Order’.  In N. Storer (Ed.) The 
Sociology of Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Mitchell, T. R. and Beach, L. R. (1990). ‘“…Do I love thee?  Let me count… toward 
an understanding of intuitive and automatic decision making’. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47: 1-20. 
Mitchell, T. R. and James, L. R. (2001). ‘Building Better Theory:  Time and the 
specification of when things happen’. Academy of Management Review, 26(4): 530-
547. 
Mobley, W. H., Griffeth, R., Hand, H. and Meglino, B. (1979). ‘A Review and 
Conceptual Analysis of the Employee Turnover Process’. Psychological Bulletin, 86: 
493-522. 
Mone M. A. and McKinley W. (1993) The Uniqueness Value and its Consequences 
for Organizational Studies’, Journal of Management Inquiry, 2(3): 284-296. 
Neuliep J.W. (Ed) (1991) Replication Research in the Social Sciences, Sage, London. 
Nietzsche, F. (1887 / 1974). The Gay Science,  (Trans. Kaufmann), Vintage, New 
York. 
 30
Nowotny, H., Scott, P. and Gibbons, M. (2001) Re-thinking Science: Knowledge and 
the public in an age of uncertainty, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Neuliep J. (Ed.) (1991), Replication Research in the Social Sciences, Sage, London. 
Pfeffer, J. (1993). ‘Barriers to the advance of organizational science: paradigm 
development as a dependent variable’. Academy of Management Review, 18(4): 599-
620. 
Pfeffer, J. (1995). ‘Mortality, reproducibility and the persistence of styles of theory’. 
Organization Science, 6(6): 681-686. 
Polanyi, M. (1946) Science, Faith and Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Popper, K. R. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Basic Books, New York. 
Popper, K. R. (1962) Conjectures and Refutations, Basic Books, New York. 
Porter, L. W., Steers, R. M., Mowday, R. T. and Boulian, P. V. (1974). 
‘Organizational Commitment, Job satisfaction and Turnover among Psychiatric 
Technicians’. Journal of Applied Psychology, 59(5): 603-609. 
Potter, J. (1996) Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction. 
London: Sage. 
Price, J. L. and Mueller, C. W. (1986). Absenteeism and Turnover of Hospital 
Employees. Connecticut, JAI Press. 
Robinson, D. Buchan, J. Hayday, S. (1999). ‘On the Agenda: changing nurse’s 
careers in 1999’. IES report no. 360, Worthing, College Hill Press. 
Rosenthal, R. (1991a).  ‘Replication in Behavioral Research’.  In J. Neuliep (Ed.) 
Replication Research in the Social Sciences, Sage, London: 1-30. 
Rosenthal, R. (1991b). Meta-Analytic Procedures For Social Research (revised ed.). 
Newbury Park California, Sage. 
 31
Rousseau, D. M. and Fried, Y. (2001). ‘Location, location, location: contextualizing 
organizational research’. Journal of Organizational Behavior,  22: 1-13. 
Sayer, A. (1992). Method in social science: a realist approach. London, Routledge. 
Schank, R. C. and Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: 
An inquiry into human knowledge structures. Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence 
Erblaum Associates. 
Starkey, K. (2001) ‘In Defence of Modes One, Two and Three:  A Response’, British 
Journal of Management, 12: S77-S80. 
Starkey, K. and Madan, P. (2001) ‘Bridging the Relevance Gap:  Aligning 
Stakeholders in the Future of Management Research’, British Journal of 
Management, 12: S3-S26. 
Steiner, C.  (1974). Scripts People Live: Transactional analysis of life scripts. New 
York, Grove Press. 
Sutton, R. I. and Staw, B. M. (1995). ‘What Theory is Not’, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 40: 371-384. 
Tranfield D., Denyer D. and Smart P. (2003) Towards a methodology for developing 
evidence-informed management knowledge by means of systematic review.  British 
Journal of Management, 14: 207-222. 
Tsang, E. W. K. and Kwan, K. (1999). ‘Replication and theory development in 
organizational science: a critical realist perspective’. Academy of Management 
Review, 24(4): 759-780. 
Van Maanen, J. (1995a). ‘Style as Theory’. Organization Science, 6(1): 133-143. 
Van Maanen, J. (1995b). ‘Fear and Loathing in Organizational Studies’. Organization 
Science, 6(6): 687-692. 
 32
 33
Vandenberg, R. J. and Nelson, J. B. (1999). ‘Disaggregating the motives underlying 
turnover intentions: when do intentions predict turnover behavior?’. Human 
Relations, 52(10): 1313-1336. 
Weber, M. (1958) ‘Science as a Vocation’.  In H. H. Gerth, and C. W. Mills (Eds) 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Weick, K. E. (1999). ‘Theory construction as disciplined reflexivity: tradeoffs in the 
90s’. Academy of Management Review, 24(4): 797-806. 
Worren N., Moore K. and Elliott R. (2002) ‘When theories become tools: Toward a 
framework for pragmatic validity’, Human Relations, 55(10): 1227–1250. 
Zald, M. N. (1996). ‘More fragmentation? unfinished business in linking the social 
sciences and the humanities’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41: 251-261. 
 
